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Abstract
To bridge the gap between model-based fault diagnosis theory and indus-
trial practice, a linear parameter varying H−/H∞ fault estimation approach
is applied to a high fidelity nonlinear aircraft benchmark. The aim is to
show how the fault estimation can provide robust early warning of actuator
fault detection scenarios that can lead to abnormal aircraft flight configu-
rations. The fault estimator state space solution is parameterized a priori
using parameter-independent design freedom. Following this only constant
free matrices are determined and the resulting affine linear parameter vary-
ing estimator has low computational load. The evaluation uses parametric
simulation via an industry standard Monte Carlo campaign supported by a
functional engineering simulator. The simulations are carried out in the pres-
ence of aerodynamic database uncertainties and measurement errors covering
a wide range of the flight envelope.
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1. Introduction
In the academic community, the methodologies of model-based fault de-
tection and diagnosis (FDD) have been widely developed in last two decades
(Patton, Frank & Clark, 1989, 2000; Isermann, 1997; Gertler, 1998; Chen &
Patton, 1999; Isermann, 2005; Ding, 2008; Bokor & Szabo, 2009; Korbicz,
Koscielny, Kowalczuk & Cholewa, 2004; Witczak, 2014) and some of them
have been successfully applied to aeronautical and aerospace missions (Ed-
wards, Lombaerts & Smaili, 2010) and have even been implemented in the
Airbus industry practice to detect the oscillatory failure (Goupil, 2010; Lavi-
gne et al., 2011). Recently, the application of linear parameter varying (LPV)
concepts to system modelling, control and FDD have also received much at-
tention (Balas, 2002; Bokor & Balas, 2004; Henry, 2008; Sato, 2010; Wei &
Verhaegen, 2011a; Hecker & Pfifer, 2014; Alwi & Edwards, 2014; Henry et al.,
2014; Varga & Ossmann, 2014; Vanek et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016; Rodonto
et al., 2015; Ossmann & Varga, 2015; Rotondo et al., 2015; Alwi et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, the technical demands of model-based FDD, especially for the
FDD problem based on using LPV, are still quite limited and restrictive in
the aerospace industry (Zolghadri, 2012).
As a leading-edge European aerospace FDD project, the EU-FP7 funded
ADDSAFE (Advanced Fault Diagnosis for Sustainable Flight Guidance and
Control) bridges a gap between the advanced model-based FDD being de-
veloped by the academic community and technical solutions demanded by
the aerospace industry. The ADDSAFE project benchmark was provided to
several academic and industrial partners involved in this project to evaluate
the efficiency of their FDD approaches on various fault scenarios (Alwi & Ed-
wards, 2014; Henry et al., 2014; Varga & Ossmann, 2014; Vanek et al., 2014;
Van Eykeren & Chu, 2014). The benchmark model is highly representative
of a generic twin engine civil commercial aircraft including the nonlinear
rigid-body aircraft model with a full set of control surfaces, actuator models,
sensor models, flight control laws and pilot inputs. The aim of the project
is to highlight the link between commercial aircraft sustainability and fault
detection, it can be demonstrated that improving the fault diagnosis per-
formance in flight control systems facilitates the optimization of the aircraft
structural design (resulting in weight saving), which in turn helps to improve
aircraft performance and to decrease its environmental footprint (e.g. fuel
consumption and noise)(Goupil & Marcos, 2014).
In this paper, an LPV H−/H∞ fault estimation approach is used to
2
provide the technical solution for the industrial benchmark scenarios. This
approach has been widely developed in the literature (Ding et al., 2000;
Wang et al., 2007; Henry & Zolghadri, 2005; Li et al., 2012; Grenaille et al.,
2008; Henry, 2012), based on the original work by Hou & Patton (1997).
There have been a number of application studies on aircraft flight control
involving the generation of FDD residuals which are robust against modelling
uncertainty, gust and turbulence (Marcos et al., 2005; Marcos & Balas, 2005;
Yang & Wang, 2010; Wei & Verhaegen, 2011b; Li et al., 2012). The purpose
of involving the H− index in an H∞ optimisation is to establish a trade-
off between the fault sensitivity and the robustness of the residual Hou &
Patton (1997). This paper extends the work in Li et al. (2012) into an
LPV framework and proposes a specific H− index which allows the fault
estimation to be achieved in the presence of parametric uncertainties. The
parameterizable solution of the fault estimator is then used to construct an
H∞ optimisation procedure.
The main motivation of the paper is to bridge the gap between the LPV
H−/H∞ approach and the technical solution required by the industry. The
fault scenario ‘Aircraft Abnormal Configuration’ (Goupil & Marcos, 2014) is
selected to be dealt with and the LPV fault estimation approach is imple-
mented at both the local actuator model level and the global system level,
to estimate various actuator jamming (also known as lock-in-place failure),
those are ’liquid’ jamming, ’solid’ jamming and the control surface disconnec-
tion. The state space solution of the fault estimator is parameterised using
a priori parameter-independent design freedom, and therefore only constant
free matrices are computed. Compared with the polytopic LPV design ap-
proach, where gain matrices with respect to all vertices are required to be
calculated and implemented, an affine LPV fault estimator can be imple-
mented straightforwardly based upon using the free matrices, which largely
reduces the computational load. Once the faults are estimated or detected
in the presence of the parametric uncertainties caused by plant-model mis-
match, aerodynamic database uncertainties, sensor noise and imperfect mea-
surements of the scheduling parameters, the faulty actuator can be replaced
by the adjacent redundant actuator at a very early stage of each fault devel-
opment, and hence avoid the aircraft abnormal configuration. Furthermore,
for the purpose of evaluating the design computational load, the fault esti-
mator is recoded using the Airbus Flight Control Computer (FCC) software
library. The fault estimation/detection results shown in this paper are eval-
uated based upon the parametric simulation and the Monte Carlo campaign
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supported by an industrial functional engineering simulator.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 introduces
the selected ADDSAFE fault scenario to be solved. The LPV modelling
encompasses both local and global levels, as discussed in Section 3. Section
4 outlines the LPV H−/H∞ approach. In Section 5 the ADDSAFE project
verification process and industrial limitations are discussed. The parametric
and Monte Carlo verification results are given in Section 6.
1.1. Notation
For a matrix X , X < 0 denotes that X is negative definite. XT , X−1 and
X† denote its transpose, inverse and pseudo-inverse respectively. He{X}
denotes a shorthand notation for X + XT and ∗ denotes the symmetric
entries of a matrix. Let an LPV system to be denoted in boldface upper
case, for example, a parameter dependent system Guy(ρ) : u 7→ y indicates
y(s) = G(s, ρ)u(s) where ρ is the time-varying scheduling parameter. ‖v‖2
denotes the frequency domain 2-norm of the signal v. L2,Ω is the Lebesgue
2-space, wherein the signal is square integrable and norm bounded in a given
finite frequency domain Ω, given by
L2,Ω = {v : ‖v‖2,Ω <∞} (1)
where ‖v‖22,Ω =
1
2pi
∫
Ω
v′(−jω)v(jω)dω. The Lebesgue 2-space becomes infinite-
horizon when Ω = [−∞,∞].
The frequency-domain H∞ performance and H− index for an LPV sys-
tem G(ρ), appropriate to a given finite frequency range Ω, are defined by
‖G(ρ)‖∞,Ω = sup
∀ρ∈Θ,∀u∈L2,Ω
‖G(ρ)u‖2,Ω
‖u‖2,Ω
, u 6= 0 (2)
‖G(ρ)‖−,Ω = inf
∀ρ∈Θ,∀u∈L2,Ω
‖G(ρ)u‖2,Ω
‖u‖2,Ω
, u 6= 0 (3)
2. ADDSAFE benchmark
2.1. Fault scenario: Aircraft Abnormal Configuration
The Aircraft Abnormal Configuration scenario is defined within the ADDSAFE
benchmark, which concerns the detection of abnormal aircraft behaviour
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 Figure 1: The locations of the actuator faults (Goupil, 2010)
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caused by an actuator or sensor fault in the control loop of a control sur-
face, between the FCC and the appropriate moving surfaces. The possible
locations of the actuator faults are listed in Fig. 1.
In this paper, three fault sub-scenarios are selected to be solved from the
standpoint of rapid and robust fault detection, these are:
• ‘Liquid’ jamming: A bias fault occurs on the left inboard aileron rod
sensor.
• ‘Solid’ jamming: The left inboard aileron control surface is jammed at
a fixed position.
• The control surface of the left inboard aileron is disconnected: A me-
chanical breakage occurs between the control surface and the actuator
rod. Furthermore, the control surface sensor of the left inboard aileron
is not necessarily available on all types of the aircraft.
The above fault sub-scenarios all lead to a control surface stuck at a
fixed position. In current industrial state-of-practice, if the fault is not de-
tected, it will trigger abnormal aircraft configurations, followed by deflection
of other control surfaces to compensate for the effects of the faults, leading to
the possibility of excessive fuel consumption. In addition, the compensation
commands, corrupted by the faults, also become unreliable. For instance, a
control surface jamming occurring on a spoiler or an aileron (as shown in the
left hand side of the Fig. 2 will result in constant sideslip and roll rates. This
will then raise the deflections of other control surfaces to compensate the
asymmetric aircraft motion (as illustrated in the right hand side of Fig. 2).
The current AIRBUS state of practice is to use a dual active/passive
scheme, i.e. an active actuator moving the control surface and adjacent
passive actuator in a stand-by mode. So, if there exists a sufficiently early and
precise fault estimation/detection, the faulty actuator can be switched off and
the adjacent passive actuator becomes active. This provides an opportunity
for the flight system to avoid the abnormal flight configuration.
In this work, ‘liquid’ and ‘solid’ jamming are modeled as additive sensor
faults acting on the local aileron rod measurements, according to

y = x fault-free case
y = x+ fliq liquid jamming
y = x+ fsol(x) solid jamming
(4)
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Figure 2: Effect of the dissymmetry (left hand side) and control surfaces used to compen-
sate (right hand side)(Goupil, 2010)
where y are the outputs of the rod sensors and x are fault-free rod sensor
outputs. fliq represents additive ‘liquid’ jamming and fsol(x) represents the
additive effect of ‘solid’ jamming. Note that fsol(x) is a function of x due to
the occurrence of ‘solid’ jamming and in this situation the sensor measure-
ments y are always stuck at fixed values.
Since there is no available control surface sensor on the left inboard
aileron, aileron surface disconnection jamming is modeled as an additive
actuator fault acting on the global model (including the aircraft rigid-body
axis dynamics), according to:{
u = u0 fault-free case
u = u0 + fdis control surface disconnection
(5)
where u denotes the control surface deflection signal, available from rod sen-
sor outputs and fdis represents the additive effect of the control surface dis-
connection. u0 denotes the control surface deflection in the fault-free case.
In this paper, the proposed fault estimation approach is used to estimate
the ‘liquid’ and ‘solid’ jamming faults at the local level (i.e. the fault estima-
tion approach is applied to a local aileron component). The control surface
disconnection is estimated at the global level (i.e. the fault estimation ap-
proach is applied to the global system level comprising the aircraft body axis
model) due to the lack of an aileron surface sensor.
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3. ADDSAFE LPV model in local and global levels
A benchmark system that is highly representative generic model of a twin
engine civil commercial aircraft is defined within the ADDSAFE benchmark,
which contains the nonlinear aircraft rigid-body model, flight control laws,
pilot inputs and a full set of actuator and sensor dynamic models (Goupil &
Puyou, 2011).
3.1. Global LPV model
In the ADDSAFE project, the LPV aircraft rigid-body model is built in
an affine manner, based on using a multivariate least-squares approximation
strategy (Hecker & Pfifer, 2014). This approach interpolates the multiple
linear time invariant models linearised at various flight points in the flight
envelope. This is effectively the affine state-space LPV model of the aircraft
system used in the fault scenario study. In particular:
A(ρ) = A0 + A1ρ1 + · · ·+ Anρρnρ (6)
The selected scheduling parameters are given by
ρ = [m(kg), Xcg(%), Vcas(kt), h(ft)] (7)
where, m is the weight of the aircraft, Xcg is the x-axis center gravity, Vcas
denotes the calibrated airspeed and h is the altitude. Note that the angle of
attack and load factor are assumed to be faulty in other ADDSAFE scenarios,
and therefore they are not selected as the scheduling parameters. It must be
stated that above selected scheduling parameters are independent from each
other. Hence, the scheduling parameters vary inside a hyper-rectangle and
satisfy the vertex property (Apkarian et al., 1995). Let v1, v2, . . . , vr denote
the vertices of the hyper-rectangle, say Θ, it follows
ρ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rnρ := Co{ν1, ν2, . . . , νr, r = 2
nρ} (8)
and
A(ρ) =
r∑
i=1
αi(ρ)A(νi),
r∑
i=1
αi(ρ) = 1, αi(ρ) ≥ 0 (9)
At the global level, the LPV model of the lateral aircraft rigid-body axis
system is given by
x˙b = Ab(ρ)xb +Bb(ρ)ub
yb = Cbxb
(10)
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where yb and xb represent the aircraft lateral outputs and states, respectively.
ub includes the set of lateral actuator rod measurements together with a
horizontal wind speed input along the aircraft body axis uw
1.
3.2. Local quasi-LPV model
At the local actuator level, the first order dynamic of each of the simplified
nonlinear servo-controller hydraulic aileron actuators (Goupil, 2010) is given
by
x˙ = KciKp(u− x)
√
δP −
Faero+Fdamping
S
δPref
(11)
where, u is the commanded rod position and x is the hydraulic actuator
rod position. The gain Kci corresponds to the servo valve conversion of
estimated current to the rod speed for each actuator and Kp is the servo
control gain. δP is the hydraulic pressure delivered to the actuator. δPref
is the constant differential pressure with the servo valve fully opened. Faero
represents the aerodynamic forces acting on the control surface. S is the
actuator piston surface area. Fdamping represents the servo-control load of
the adjacent actuator in damping mode.
The local quasi-LPV formulation of Eq. (11) is established by Hecker &
Pfifer (2014):
x˙ = −K(ρ, x, sign(x˙))x+K(ρ, x, sign(x˙))u (12)
where ρ is defined in Eq. (7) and
K(ρ, x, sign(x˙)) = C0(ρ) + C1(ρ)sign(x˙)(x+ C2(ρ)) (13)
where C0(ρ), C1(ρ) and C2(ρ) depend affinely on ρ, and this dependence is
calculated using a parameter fitting approach based on comparing the output
responses of the nonlinear actuator model and LPV model. In (12), sign(x˙)
is a function of the deflection rate, which is used to distinguish the upward
and downward movements of the control surface when x˙ 6= 0, given by
sign(x˙) =


1 if x˙ > 0
0 if x˙ = 0
− 1 if x˙ < 0
(14)
1In ADDSAFE, the wind effect is not taken into account (i.e. uw = 0)
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In the situation x˙ = 0, the control surface does not move. The aerody-
namic force acting on the control surface is fixed at given specific flight condi-
tion. Also, there is no further upward or downward deflection is commanded,
the actuator does not have to work against the disturbing aerodynamic force
and therefore the dynamic is fixed at a given flight point.
4. LPV H−/H∞ Fault Estimation
Consider an affine LPV system subject to actuator and sensor faults and
parametric uncertainties, given by
x˙ = A(ρ)x+B(ρ)u+ F (ρ)f +M(ρ)δ
y = C(ρ)x+D(ρ)u+H(ρ)f +N(ρ)δ
(15)
where, x, u, and y represent the system states, inputs and outputs respec-
tively. f ∈ L2,Ω denotes the sensor or actuator fault or a combination of
sensor and actuator faults. δ ∈ L2,Ω represents the parametric uncertainties.
As defined in Eq. (8), the scheduling parameters ρ are assumed to vary in a
polytope Θ. All parameter-dependent matrices in Eq. (15) are assumed to
depend affinely on ρ (as shown in Eq. (6)) and satisfy the vertex property (as
shown in Eq. (9)). Provided that the sensor fault is additive, H(ρ) becomes
a fixed matrix, i.e. H(ρ) = H .
Assumption 4.1. (i) (C(ρ), A(ρ)) is detectable, ∀ρ ∈ Θ.(ii) Matrix H is full
column rank. (iii) Gfy(ρ) : f 7→ y has no zeros on the extended imaginary
axis, ∀ρ ∈ Θ.
Remark 4.1. In Assumption 4.1, (i) guarantees that, ∀ρ ∈ Θ, there exists
L(ρ) such that A(ρ) + L(ρ)C(ρ) is negative, which can be verified using the
vertex property. (ii) is necessary for the existence of the solution of the LPV
fault estimator, which is relaxed by Wang & Yang (2008). For the actuator
disconnection failure case, H is not full column rank and a small perturbation
matrix can be used to perturb H to fulfill the full column requirement (Wang
et al., 2007; Li & Zhou, 2009). (iii) is necessary for the existence of a stable
fault estimator.
The proposed fault estimator is given by
˙ˆx = A(ρ)xˆ+B(ρ)u− L1(ρ)(y − yˆ)
yˆ = C(ρ)xˆ+D(ρ)u
fˆ = L2(y − yˆ)
(16)
10
where L1(ρ) and L2 are estimator gains. yˆ denotes the observer outputs and
fˆ represents the fault estimate. Let e = x − xˆ, the error dynamics between
observer and plant are given by
e˙ =(A(ρ) + L1(ρ)C(ρ))e+ (F (ρ) + L1(ρ)H)f + (M(ρ) + L1(ρ)N(ρ))δ
fˆ =L2C(ρ)e + L2Hf + L2N(ρ)δ
(17)
Since an ideal fault estimator requires Gfˆf(ρ) = I, whereGfˆf (ρ) : fˆ 7→ f .
This is equivalent to finding a fault estimator to achieve a specific H− index
‖Gfˆf(ρ)‖− ≥ 1 since ‖I‖− ≥ 1. The robust fault estimation problem can
now be formulated as an H−/H∞ problem:
Problem 4.1. Given a system in Eq.(15), find a stable robust fault estimator
with gain matrices L1(ρ) and L2 to generate a fault estimate fˆ , achieving the
following infimum:
γ := inf
∀ρ∈Θ
{‖Gfˆδ(ρ)‖∞,Ω : ‖Gfˆf (ρ)‖−,Ω ≥ 1} (18)
According to Chen et al. (2016), Eq. (18) is also equivalent to
γ := inf
∀ρ∈Θ
{‖Gfˆδ(ρ)‖∞,Ω : Gfˆf (ρ) = I} (19)
Since L2 6= 0, the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve Gfˆf(ρ) = I
is that both F (ρ) + L1(ρ)H = 0 and L2H = I are satisfied for any ρ ∈ Θ.
It follows from the work in Li et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2016) that the
corresponding solutions of L1(ρ) and L2 are given by
L1(ρ) = −F (ρ)H
† + Z1H
⊥ (20)
L2 = H
† + Z2D
⊥
f (21)
where Z1 and Z2 are design matrices to be calculated to achieve fault estima-
tion. Substituting Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) into the error dynamic in Eq. (17),
the H−/H∞ performance γ in in Eq.(19) can be achieved via finding a sym-
metric positive definite matrix P , full matrix Z1 and Z2, such that
He{P (A(ρ)− F (ρ)H†C(ρ) + Z1H⊥C(ρ))} ∗ ∗P (M(ρ)− F (ρ)H†N(ρ) + Z1H⊥N(ρ)) −γI ∗
(H† + Z2H
⊥)C(ρ) (H† + Z2H
⊥)N(ρ) −γI

 < 0
(22)
11
It is clear that the above matrix inequality is not convex. According to
the vertex property (Apkarian et al. (1995)), solving the matrix inequality is
equivalent to finding a symmetric positive definite matrix P , full matrix S
and Z2, such that, for all i, j ∈ 1, 2, · · · , r:
He{PA(νi)− PF (νj)H†C(νi) + SH⊥C(νi)} ∗ ∗PM(νi)− PF (νj)H†N(νi) + SH⊥C(νi) −γI ∗
(H† + Z2H
⊥)C(νi) (H
† + Z2H
⊥)N(νi) −γI

 < 0
(23)
Then the matrix Z1 can be calculated via Z1 = P
−1S. After solving both Z1
and Z2, the fault estimator gains L1(ρ) and L2 can be solved directly using
Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) rather than calculating polytopic gains. Note that
the resulting estimator gains may not always stabilize the fault estimator.
An inner-outer factorization has to be performed and the fault estimation
performance will be scarified, which is not discussed in this paper.
Note that the work in this paper is different from one presented in Chen
et al. (2016). In Chen et al. (2016), sensor faults are estimated based upon
using an LPV reference model and the robustness of the fault estimation is
ensured by minimising the distance between the actual fault estimation and
one from the reference design. The method in Chen et al. (2016) contains
two steps and relies on an ideal reference solution to be calculated in the first
step. In this paper, a fault estimator is calculated straightforwardly in one
step and therefore an ideal reference solution is not required.
5. Performance Evaluation
5.1. Parametric simulation
The robustness of the fault estimation/detection will be evaluated over
the whole flight envelope with various measurements and aerodynamic database
uncertainties. During the evaluation process, a parametric simulation is run
to provide an initial robustness verification based on multiple fixed flight con-
ditions inside the flight envelope (listed in Table 1). The units of the flight
conditions are fixed in the ADDSAFE project.
For each of the simulation flight conditions in the flight envelope, error
bounds on the uncertain aerodynamic parameters, sensor measurements and
estimation of physical parameters are applied, according to the information
given in Table 2.
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Table 1: Multiple flight conditions inside flight envelope chosen for parametric simulation
Parameter flight conditions
Altitude (ft×103) 8 18 28 38
Calibrated airspeed (kts) 160 220 300
Mass (ton) 120 180 233
Center of gravity (%) 17 30 41
Table 2: Aerodynamic database uncertainty bounds, sensor measurements and estimation
Parameter Variable Min Max
Aerodynamic δCx, δCy, δCz −5% 0 5%
coefficients δCl, δCm, δCn
Measurements δVcas, δh −10% 0 10%
Estimation δm, δXcg −10% 0 10%
Clearly, after combining four altitude values, three various values of cal-
ibrated airspeeds, mass and center of gravity, and the upper and lower un-
certainty bounds of uncertainty listed in Table 1 and Table 2, for each fault
sub-scenario, a parametric simulation will cover 324 grid points. Among 324
points, 158 flight points correspond most closely to realistic flight behaviour
are selected for the parametric validation.
5.2. Industrial Monte-Carlo Campaign
The Monte Carlo campaign is run by the industry, based upon statistical
sampling of the flight conditions within the bound of the flight envelope,
according to a suitable probability distribution.
For the Monte Carlo simulation campaign, 1200 fault-free runs are dis-
tributed evenly (i.e. 200 each) among six benchmark-defined flight manoeu-
vres which will be discussed later. Then 1000 runs are distributed evenly
among the different types of faults applicable to the fault scenario (e.g. 333
runs for ‘liquid’ jamming, 333 runs for ‘solid’ jamming and 334 runs for
control surface disconnection).
5.3. Evaluation Tools: Functional Engineering Simulator
The performance robustness of the proposed fault estimator is evaluated
using the Functional Engineering Simulator (FES). FES is a term used in
Space Systems Engineering to describe a software simulator describing the
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components of a system (including its operating environment) at a functional
level. FES systems are used in support of the specification, design, verifica-
tion and operations of space systems, and can be used across the spacecraft
development life-cycle, including activities such as system design validation,
software verification and validation, spacecraft unit and sub-system test ac-
tivities (Fernandez et al., 2010). The FES developed by Deimos Space S.L.U.
for the ADDSAFE project (Fernandez & Ramon, 2011) is a non-real-time
simulator based on Simulink, Matlab and XML that includes the Airbus
benchmark model as well as the robustness and performances metrics for
all the fault scenarios defined in the project (Goupil & Marcos, 2012). In
ADDSAFE project, both the parametric simulation or the Monte-Carlo cam-
paign are run based upon using FES. In addition, the predefined evaluation
metrics, for instance, detection time performance (DTP), false alarm rate
(FA), missed detection rate (MD) will be calculated by FES.
5.4. Industrial Limitation and Constraints
On a large civil aircraft, the computing capability of the FCC is low
and the proven and robust processors must be used for critical applications.
Therefore, it is hard to use advanced processing with high computational
load, like on-line optimisation or even wavelet or Fourier transforms.
In ADDSAFE project, to facilitate the industrial evaluation of the com-
putational load of the design, the fault estimation algorithm is recoded purely
based on the Airbus state of practice for the FCC software coding SAO (Air-
bus software, Computer-Assised Specifiation) library, which contains a set
of graphical functional blocks in the manner of SIMULINK blocks, allowing
only a limited set of mathematical operations. Then, an automatic genera-
tion tool is used to calculate the computational load and produce the code
to be implemented in the FCC.
6. Benchmark results
Both the ’liquid’ and ’solid’ jamming faults are estimated at the local
level, the corresponding quasi-LPV model is given by
x˙ = −K(ρ, x, sign(x˙))x+K(ρ, x, sign(x˙))u+ δl(y, u, ρ)
y = x+ fjam
(24)
where fjam represents the jamming faults (fliq or fsol) in the rod sensor
measurements. δl(y, u, ρ) represents the parametric uncertainties (defined
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in Table 2) in a local level. A new scheduling parameter ρ˜ of the quasi-
LPV model is defined, such that ρ˜ =
[
ρ x
]T
and sign(x˙) allow upward
and downward movements of the control surfaces to be distinguished. More
details of using the above quasi-LPV model in (24) to approximate actuator
dynamics in (11) are discussed in Hecker & Pfifer (2014); Varga & Ossmann
(2014); Ossmann & Varga (2015).
The effect of the control surface disconnection is estimated at the global
level and the associated faulty LPV model is given by
x˙b = Ab(ρ)xb +Bb(ρ)ub +Bb(ρ)Wfdis +Mgδg(y, u, ρ)
yb = Cbxb +Hfdis
(25)
where yb =
[
φ p r
]T
and xb =
[
φ vy p r
]T
represent the aircraft lateral
outputs and states, respectively. φ and p denote the roll angle and roll rate,
respectively. r is the yaw rate measurement and vy is velocity of the air-
craft along y-axis. ub contains rod measurements of the four ailerons, eight
spoilers and one rudder. fdis represents the effect of the control surface dis-
connection. δg(y, u, ρ) represents the parametric uncertainty in a globe level
and Mg denotes its distribution matrix. As argued in Wang et al. (2007);
Li & Zhou (2009), H is chosen to be a small perturbation matrix to ensure
it is full column rank. The value of Mg is obtained using a linear fractional
transformation-based realization (Marcos et al., 2007). Furthermore, as ar-
gued by Alwi & Edwards (2014), parametric uncertainties δg mainly affect
the channels with respect to the roll rate and the yaw rate. W is a diagonal
semi-positive definite weighting matrix with diagonal elements representing
the efficiency levels of corresponding control surfaces. For control surface
disconnection, the diagonal element associated with left inboard aileron in
W is ’1’, the other diagonal elements are set to be ’0’.
The H−/H∞ LPV fault estimation approach introduced in Section 4 is
then applied to the local model and global model to estimate fjam and fdis,
respectively. Note that in Eq. (24) and Eq. (25), the output matrices and
the uncertainty distribution matrices are all constant. This largely reduces
the design conservatism and only r LMIs are required to be solved to find P .
In this paper, the design results are not included due to the confidential
requirements of the project. Therefore, only simulation results from the FES
simulator are presented.
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6.1. Fault free case
For ADDSAFE fault scenarios, a zero false alarm rate must be guaranteed
in the fault-free situation. Here, six flight conditions or manoeuvres are cho-
sen to be simulated as fault-free. These are: Nose up (abrupt longitudinal
manoeuvre), Angle of attack (AOA) protection (triggering of angle of at-
tack protection), Pitch protection (triggering of pitch protection), Yaw angle
mode (corresponding to an enhanced auto-pilot hold mode), Turn coordina-
tion (coordinated turn) and Cruise phase. For each flight manoeuver, 158
and 200 runs are executed for the parametric and Monte Carlo simulations,
respectively. During six flight manoeuvres in the fault-free case, residual
signals associated with ‘liquid’ jamming, ‘solid’ jamming and the surface dis-
connection are shown in Figs. 3-8. The green lines in Figs. 3-8 represent
values of constant thresholds. Clearly, in the fault-free case, residual signals
do not trigger thresholds and the zero false alarm can be guaranteed. Note
that the labelling of the y-axis is hidden from Figs. 3-8 due to the industrial
limitation.
6.2. Inboard aileron failure case
In the aileron failure case, the aircraft is assumed to be in Cruise ma-
noeuvre. Normalized Monte Carlo fault estimation and detection results
associated with ‘liquid’ jamming, ‘solid’ jamming and the control surface
disconnection scenarios are shown in Fig. 9, Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively.
In ‘liquid’ jamming, ‘solid’ jamming and control surface disconnection sce-
narios, the jamming represents 1.3%, 1.8% and 21.4% of the control surface
deflection operational range, respectively. Figure. 9(a) shows demands of the
left inboard aileron on various flight conditions and Fig. 9(b) depicts aileron
rod sensor measures which are corrupted by ‘liquid’ jamming. Figure 9(c)
shows fault estimates of ‘liquid’ jamming and it can be seen from Fig. 9(c)
that estimated ’liquid’ jamming occur around 11sec and then disappears. For
the purpose of confirming the fault occurrence and reducing the effect of the
spike raised during the Yaw angle mode manoeuvre in the fault-free case, a
fixed post-filter is added, specifically for ‘liquid’ jamming, to reduce the effect
of the spike, whilst maintaining both the amplitudes of the fault estimates
and the effect of the bias. The transfer function of the post-filer is given by
T (s) = (s + 1)/(s + 5). Then an integrator is used to maintain the effect
of the fault bias till the end of the simulation for the decision making pur-
pose. The filtered fault estimates are shown in Fig. 9(d) wherein blue lines
represent residuals in the presence of the parametric uncertainties and the
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green line represents the value of the constant threshold used for detecting
‘liquid’ jamming. Fault estimation errors between fault estimates and faults
on various flight conditions are shown in Fig. 9(e). Clearly from Fig. 9(e),
fault estimation errors are close to zero despite various flight conditions and
parametric uncertainties. The mean and variance of fault estimation errors
in the presence of ‘liquid’ jamming are 0.0013 and 3.039e− 08, respectively.
Fault detection signals with respect to various flight conditions are shown in
Fig. 9(f). In Fig. 9(f), changes of boolean signals from ‘0’ to ‘1’ represent the
situations in which faults are detected and confirmed. It is clear that ‘liquid’
jamming can be detected rapidly despite all flight conditions.
Fault estimation and detection performance in the presence of ‘solid’ jam-
ming are shown in Fig. 10. Figure 10(a) shows demands of the left inboard
aileron on various flight conditions and aileron rod sensor measurements af-
fected by ‘solid’ jamming are shown in Fig. 10(b). Blue lines in Fig. 10(c)
depict fault estimates despite various flight conditions and parametric uncer-
tainties and the green line represents the constant threshold. Fault estima-
tion errors on various flight conditions are shown in Fig. 11(d). It is clear
that fault estimation errors are close to zero and fault estimates correctly
reconstruct faults despite parametric uncertainties. The mean and variance
of fault estimation errors are 0.0014 and 2.7972e − 08, respectively. It is
also clear from Fig. 10(e) that, for all testing conditions, faults are detected
immediately after their occurrence.
Figure 11 demonstrates fault estimation performance in the face of control
surface disconnections. Figures 11(a) and 11(b) show left inboard aileron
commands and their rod sensor measurements, respectively. It can be seen
from Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) that the rod sensor is fault-free and therefore
faults are chosen to be estimated at the global system level. Using the LPV
observer proposed in this paper, fault estimates and fault detection signals
despite various flight conditions and parametric uncertainties are shown in
Fig. 11(c) and Fig. 11(e), respectively. Note that fault estimates in Fig. 11(c)
are sparse compared with those shown in Fig. 10(c). This is because left
inboard aileron commands in Fig. 11(a) are sparse when effected by surface
disconnections. Clearly from Fig. 11(c), the fault estimator is stable and
robust enough so that parametric uncertainties do not significantly reduce the
estimation performance. The mean and variance of fault estimation errors in
the presence of surface disconnections cannot be calculated straightforwardly
due to the lack of the control surface sensor in the left inboard aileron and
the knowledge of the additive effect of the disconnection fdis is not available
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from the FES.
The evaluation results of the parametric simulation and the Monte Carlo
campaign, generated using FES, are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
It is clear from Tables 3 and 4 that the false alarm rate (FA) and missed
detection rate (MD) are zero despite various flight conditions and parametric
uncertainties. The detection time performance (DTP) (the value ’1’ indicates
that that the fault is detected at the required detection time and any values
between ’0’ and ’1’ indicates a faster detection) is stable and low, which
implies that all faults are detected rapidly.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, an H−/H∞ LPV fault estimation approach is applied to
deal with an industrial benchmark problem. The design computational load
and the fault estimation performance are evaluated by Airbus, via using FCC
software tools and the FES tool. The simulation results from the Monte Carlo
campaign show the robustness of the fault estimation against the parametric
uncertainties raised by plant-model mismatch, aerodynamic database uncer-
tainties and physical parameter measurements errors. The future work is to
evaluate the proposed scheme in the most recent EU-FP7 RECONFIGURE
project (Goupil et al., 2014, 2015) wherein a larger range of flight conditions,
more challenging fault detection/fault tolerant control scenarios and various
flight manoeuvres including different wind profiles and turbulence are taken
into account.
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